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Crime and insecurity aﬀect human welfare in many ways. There is the direct cost of crime on
victims and the ricochet eﬀect on their friends and relatives. There is also the sense of fear people
experience even if they have not been victims of crime. In addition to the direct cost of crime,
insecurity generates large economic losses: business and trade are diverted, investment and
savings are reduced, and resources are wasted protecting property rights and ensuring personal
safety. Insecurity also induces populations to vote for and support strong men who promise
security, even at the expense of personal freedom and civil rights. Concerns for security are
on the rise everywhere, and most countries experienced increases in crime rates in the 1990s
(e.g. Newman 1999, Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza 1998). Expenditures on private security
personnel and protection equipment are increasing in many countries (Fajnzylber, Lederman &
Loayza 2000). As the rich seek to protect themselves and their assets, the poor too often end
up bearing the brunt of insecurity (Pradhan & Ravallion 1999).
In both developed and developing countries, the focus has long been on urban crime. By
analogy with the US (e.g. Glaeser & Sacerdote 1999, Dilulio 1996, Clinard & Abbott 1973),
urbanization is often thought to drive increases in crime in poor countries as well. In Ghana, for
instance, much of the increase in crime rates has been attributed to urbanization (Barak 2000).
Cities are often ideal places for crime because criminals have a larger number of potential targets
and a lower risk of detection than in a small community (Freeman 1996). Crime is frequently
found to be correlated with poverty, unemployment, and inequality￿ all common features of large
cities in developing countries (e.g. Ehrlich 1973, Ehrlich & Brower 1987, Fajnzylber, Lederman
& Loayza 2000, Bourguignon 2000, Hull 2000). Furthermore, most crime is committed by young
men, and since young men account for a large proportion of migrants to cities, one would again
expect increases in crime rates there (Clinard & Abbott 1973). Finally, cities in poor countries
1harbor a large foot-loose population freed from the social pressure found in many small, rural
communities, and hence more prone to express its criminal tendencies (e.g. Glaeser, Sacerdote
& Scheinkman 1996, Sah 1991, Lederman, Loayza & Menendez 2000). One exception is cattle
theft which is more likely in rural areas where cattle are raised.
The focus on urban crime leaves one to believe that crime is rare or even non-existent in
rural areas. Little is known about rural crime and insecurity in the developing world. Gugler
(1991), for instance, argues that Nigerian parents living in large cities often send their children
back to the village to be raised where it is safer. The plight of the rural poor is thought to be
more easily bearable because what little property they have is safe.
This paper investigates the relationship between crime and isolation. Using a commune
census undertaken in Madagascar immediately prior to the 2001 presidential election, we examine
the incidence of various types of crime ￿ cattle theft, burglary, homicide, vehicle theft, and rape
￿ as a function of population density and distance to the nearest major city. We test whether
crime is primarily an urban phenomenon driven by proximity to other people and favored by
ease of transportation.
The choice of Madagascar as study country is quite propitious. Madagascar has high crime
rates. The rate of homicides is as high if not higher than it was in the US in the early 1990s.
Other forms of criminal activity are similarly high, especially cattle theft. Yet, unlike other
parts of the developing world, Madagascar has known relatively little political violence and has
witnessed no guerilla activity in recent memory. In 2002, for instance, contested election results
led to a temporary partition of the country between its two main politicians. Both parties,
however, refrained from arming militias and the con￿ict was ended in June 2002 with little
bloodshed. This enables us to study crime in isolation from political con￿icts which are now
thought to be related to crime (e.g. Collier 2000, Collier & Hoeﬄer 1998).
2We ￿nd that, contrary to the US, crime in Madagascar is negatively related with population
density and positively related with isolation, even after we control for various risk factors. Except
for vehicle theft, other categories of criminal activity are more prevalent in areas with low
population density and a long way from the nearest city. Much of the rural crime in Madagascar
is typically blamed on the Dahalo, which can be described as organized rural crime gangs.
What the data suggest is that dahalos are not a folk legend; they are a sad reality of rural life.
While these results contrast Madagascar with, say, the US, it may be in line with other African
countries.1 Examples of a high incidence of rural crime in Africa can be found, for instance,
in the works of Andre & Platteau (1998), Smith, Barrett & Box (2001), and Poewe (1989).
Whether a high incidence of rural crime is speci￿c to Madagascar, Africa as a whole, or all poor
countries remains an open question for further investigation.
An analysis of crime would be incomplete without factoring in the role of law enforcement
(Becker 1968). The incidence of crime is usually aﬀected by the presence and eﬀectiveness of the
police (e.g. Ehrlich 1996, Rasmussen, Benson & Sollars 1993, Barak 2000, Levitt 1997, Levitt
1998). While not much is known about police and crime control in the developing world, police
forces are generally urban-based and under-funded (Hills 2000). Lack of policing in isolated
area may thus account for higher crime rates. Before we can conclude that isolation by itself is
associated with more crime, we need to control for law enforcement.
The diﬃculty is that law enforcement personnel is often posted in areas worst aﬀected by
crime, thereby generating endogeneity bias. We therefore need to instrument law enforcement.
Finding suitable instruments is often diﬃcult. Fortunately, in the case of Madagascar we ￿nd
that law enforcement personnel prefer to be posted in cities where amenities are better. As
1In South Africa, however, Demombynes & Ozler (2002) ￿nd a signi￿cant and positive correlation between all
crimes and population density. Given that South Africa is much more developed than other sub-Saharan countries,
it may be that rural crime is characteristic of poor countries ￿ or it may be that South Africa is diﬀerent, because
of its unusual history. This issue deserves more research.
3amenities have no independent eﬀect on crime once we control for poverty and inequality, they
c a nb eu s e da si n s t r u m e n t .
Results show that the observed relationship between isolation and crime is not due to a bias
in policing. As anticipated, law enforcement personnel tend to locate in communes that are
close to schools and hospitals. But after we correct for endogeneity in police placement, we still
￿nd that crime incidence is higher is isolated, less populated communes, even when they have
more law enforcement personnel. If anything, police presence raises crime incidence, probably
because of a reporting bias: more crimes are reported in areas where law enforcement personnel
are present and active. This suggests that the actual incidence of rural crime is likely to be even
higher than reported.
We also investigate subjective the insecurity ranking of commune residents, an indicator that
is free from law enforcement reporting bias. This subjective indicator is strongly correlated with
crime incidence. Results again show that feelings of insecurity are highest in low population
density, isolated areas. We ￿nd that law enforcement personnel tend to locate near crime but
their presence has no signi￿cant eﬀect on people￿s subjective feelings of insecurity. Although
police presence is not suﬃcient to make people feel secure, it helps solve crime: communes with
more gendarmes have a higher proportion of stolen cattle recovered.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief introduction to the conceptual frame-
work. The data is presented in Section 3, together with descriptive statistics. Simple regressions
on crime incidence are discussed in Section 4. Police placement and its eﬀect on crime are ex-
amined in Section 5. Regression results using subjective measures of insecurity are presented in
Section 6.
42. Conceptual framework
Crime is a natural tendency of human beings (e.g. Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973). In any population,
some people are predisposed to crime. If the conditions are ￿right￿, this predisposition expresses
itself and crime occurs. On the basis of this simple observation, we expect the average number
of crimes E[ci] committed in location i to be roughly proportional to population Pi in that
location.
Diﬀerent segments of the population have diﬀerent propensities toward crime. Men, for
instance, especially young men, are more prone to violent crime (e.g. Grogger 1997, Clinard
& Abbott 1973). Consequently, we expect E[ci] to increase with the share SMi o fm e ni nt h e
population of location i. Similarly, we expect migrants SIi to be more crime prone because they
live outside the boundaries of social control: crime is less likely to be noticed by neighbors and
relatives, and less likely to result in social sanctions (e.g. Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman 1996,
Sah 1991, Lederman, Loayza & Menendez 2000). In contrast, because the sedentary nature of
agriculture favors social sanctions, we would expect the proportion of men engaged in farming
SAi to reduce crime. The only exception is when social customs call for young men to prove
their courage by stealing cattle.
Crime rates are usually thought to be aﬀected by poverty and inequality (e.g. Ehrlich &
Brower 1987, Blau & Blau 1982, Doyle, Ahmed & Horn 1999, Imrohoroglu, Merlo & Rupert
2000, Morgan 2000, Bourguignon 2000, Demombynes & Ozler 2002, Fafchamps & Minten 2002,
Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza 2001). For poor people, monetary gains from crime are higher
relative to non-crime income, hence raising the attractiveness of criminal activity. By reducing
the opportunity cost of time, poverty reduces the deterrence eﬀect of jail sentences. Stigma costs
are also lower for poor people (Rasmusen 1996). For these reasons, we expect locations with a
higher proportion of poor people Ui to incur more crime. Inequality Ii is also thought to have
5an eﬀect on crime that is distinct from that of poverty. Controlling for poverty, more inequality
means more wealth to be stolen. Furthermore, inequality engenders envy and potentially reduces
guilt for stealing from the rich.
Crime incidence also depends on the intensity of social interaction. Child upbringing matters.
Glaeser & Sacerdote (1999), for instance, show that there is more crime in US cities with a
larger proportion of female-headed households Hi. If we regard the criminal as a predator and
the victim as the prey, the number of committed crimes should increase with the number of
encounters between a prospective criminal and his or her potential victims. For this reason,
we expect crime to increase with population density Ni: the less dense population is, the fewer
opportunities for theft, rape, and murder (Hull 2000). For the same reason, we expect road
links Ri to increase crime because they facilitate human interaction and thus create a greater
likelihood of an encounter with the violent and the criminally inclined. This is, for instance,
the interpretation given by Rephann (1999) who ￿nds that US rural counties closer to highways
have more crime. For all these reasons, we expect isolated populations to be less subjected to
crime.
Other risk factors, such as alcohol or drug consumption, are also expected to play a role
(Grogger & Willis 1998). Although we cannot measure consumption directly, we suspect it is
correlated with the presence of bars and, thus, of electricity Vi. Ethnic diversity is also expected
to increase crime if it reduces social bonds and guilt (e.g. Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman 1996,
Easterly & Levine 1997). Using international comparison of country-level data, Fajnzylber,
Lederman & Loayza (2000) ￿n das t r o n ge ﬀect of ethnic diversity on crime. We therefore expect
more crime where ethnic fractionalization Fi is more acute. Certain types of criminal activities,
such as cattle theft, are by de￿nition more likely in areas with abundant livestock (Smith, Barrett
6& Box 2001). To summarize, we expect the following:
E[ci]=Pih(Pi,U i,I i,H i,N i,F i,R i,V i,S Mi,S Ii,S Ai,D R) (2.1)
where DR a r er e g i o no re t h n i ce ﬀects capturing location-speci￿c factors, including thieving
customs.
Crime statistics are count data. It is therefore natural to assume they follow some kind
of Poisson process ￿ or generalization thereof. In our analysis, we posit a generalized negative
binomial distribution for crime. This formulation has the advantage of allowing for overdisper-
sion, that is, for the fact that the Poisson density is too restrictive for most count data (see
(Greene 1997), Chapter 19). Formally, we assume that the number of crimes ci is distributed as
a Poisson(νiµi) with
µi = Pi exp(Xiβ) (2.2)
where Xi stands for all the variables entering h(.) in equation (2.1) and where νi is an unobserved
individual eﬀect with a Γ(1/αi,1/αi) density. Premultiplication µi by Pi ( c a l l e da no ﬀset)
corrects for diﬀerences in population across locations and is equivalent to estimating the model
in terms of crime rate. The model is further generalized by letting the variance of individual
eﬀects νi vary across observations, i.e., by assuming ln(αi)=Ziγ with Zi a vector of variables
thoughtto aﬀectthe variance. In ouranalysis, we normally set Zi = Xi. With these assumptions,













7Equation (2.1) does not allow for law enforcement personnel and deterrence. In general, we
expect the police to catch and punish (some of the) criminals (e.g. Levitt 1997, Levitt 1998,
Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza 1998). Let the punishment be Ji and let the probability of
being caught be an increasing function of the number of law enforcement personnel p(Li):T h e
gain from crime is written Gi; it is enjoyed only if not caught. The expected gain from crime
is p(Li)Ji +( 1− p(Li))Gi.S i n c ep(Li) increases in Li, we see that police presence reduces the
expected gain from crime. To the extent that criminals weigh punishment against the instant
grati￿cation crime provides, we expect Li to have a deterrent eﬀect on crime: the higher Li is,
the higher Gi must be to make crime pro￿table (Becker 1968). Of course, the deterrence eﬀect
of police presence assumes that criminals are rational.
If Gi varies across locations ￿ for instance because of population density ￿ then achieving a
similar level of criminal activity requires a higher level of policing. Let g(Li) be the threshold
level of Gi required to induce crime when law enforcement personnel is Li. In any population,
some proportion of individuals have a Gi >g (Li) and thus commit crime. This means that the
expected number of crimes E[Ci] is a decreasing function of Li. We write this as:
µi = Piexp(Xiβ − τ logLi) (2.4)
where parameter τ measures the deterrence eﬀect of police presence.
For β and τ in equation (2.4) to be estimated consistently, we must account for the possibility
that government locates more law enforcement personnel where Gi is highest. In this case,
regressing crime on police presence would yield spurious results: Li is correlated with Gi and
thus unobserved factors that aﬀect crime incidence also aﬀect police presence. It is therefore
necessary to instrument Li.T ot h i se ﬀect, we need factors that aﬀect police presence but have
no anticipated eﬀect on crime. In general, such variables are diﬃcult to come by. Thankfully,
8the speci￿c situation of Madagascar suggests possible candidates. Because law enforcement
personnel are skilled civil servants, they expect a certain level of public amenities. For instance,
they probably wish for their families to be located reasonably close to schools and health facilities,
to face a reasonably low cost of living, and to enjoy access to electricity and running water. These
factors are thus likely to aﬀect police placement. At the same time, they are unlikely to have
a direct eﬀect on crime ￿ at least on the types of criminal activity for which we have data. In
a country as poor as Madagascar, diﬀerences in public amenities between locations are so large
that they can serve as instrument. Once police placement has been properly instrumented, we
expect its eﬀect on crime to be negative or, in case of no deterrence, zero.
So far we have reasoned that isolation and low population density reduce crime incidence. It
is also conceivable that they encourage crime. Lack of roads makes it diﬃcult for law enforcement
personnel to pursue criminals. Low population density makes it hard to ￿nd witnesses. Put
diﬀerently, it is possible that bad roads and dispersed human settlements reduce p(Li) and
t h ed e t e r r e n c ee ﬀect of police presence. If this eﬀect on deterrence is strong enough, it would
generate a lower τ in isolated and less densely populated areas. But it would not, by itself,
generate a negative relationship between crime and isolation in equation (2.2) where we do not
control for Li.
For such a relationship to arise, other assumptions are required. One possibility is that low
population density reduces the probability of detection so much that any form of punishment
￿ legal or informal ￿ is unlikely. If this were the case, the eﬀectiveness of law enforcement and
of social sanctions would be lower in isolated areas, contrary to what happens in developed
countries. Another possibility is that isolation may foster strong identi￿cation within a small
group but relatively con￿ictual relations with other groups. When people from diﬀerent isolated
groups come into contact, the likelihood for con￿ict and crime may increase (Diamond 1997). In
9this context, we would expect violence to erupt between neighboring groups. This is consistent
with ￿ndings in the northern Kenyan and southern Ethiopian rangelands, where households
living close to hostile ethnic groups had higher expectations of crime and violence (Smith,
Barrett & Box 2001). Other possibilities exist as well, such as alcohol abuse or cultural factors.
Since our data does not enable us to distinguish between these alternative explanations, these
issues are left for further research.
Having clari￿ed our conceptual framework and testing strategy, we now turn to empirical
implementation.
3. The data
The data for this study come from three sources: a commune-level survey conducted in 2001,
the 1993 national population census, and estimates of poverty and inequality constructed by
Mistiaen, Ozler, Raza￿manantena & Raza￿ndravonona (2002) on the basis of the 1993 census.
Our unit of analysis is the commune, a geographically de￿ned administrative unit in Madagascar,
roughly equivalent to a county. Madagascar has six provinces (or faritany), which are divided
into ￿vondronana. The ￿vondronana are made up of communes ￿ the smallest administrative
units with direct representation from the central or provincial government. Rural communes are
further divided into fokontany, which essentially represent individual villages. Each commune
has a locally elected mayor and a dØlØguØ appointed by the province. As of late 2001, there were
approximately 1390 communes in Madagascar, but the exact number remains unclear due to the
existence of con￿icting ￿oﬃcial￿ lists. This confusion is the result of changes in the boundaries
and composition of some communes in the mid-1990s. This means that approximately 20 percent
of the communes surveyed in 2001 did not have an exact equivalent in the 1993 census.
The commune survey used in this research was conducted over a three-month period in 2001
10in a collaboration between Cornell University, Oxford University, and the Malagasy agricultural
research institute (FOFIFA). The remoteness of some communes and the general lack of na-
tional data on certain subjects meant that little was known about the spatial distribution of
public goods and services, economic activity, or crime prior to this study. The commune survey
gathered statistics such as the number of gendarmes and police, crime ￿gures, and educational
enrollment, from the relevant government oﬃces in the commune. More subjective questions,
such as those concerning local prices, transportation, access to various goods and services, major
economic activities, and community perceptions of existing conditions, were answered by a fo-
cus group composed of residents of the commune. The survey was conducted at the commune￿s
administrative center. A total of 1385 communes were surveyed, all but 9 currently functioning
communes.2
The 1993 population census is the most recent government census currently available in
Madagascar. Information from this census includes population ￿gures by gender and various
age groups, literacy rates, employment ￿gures, and percent of the population with amenities
such as electricity and running water. Because this information is available by commune based
on the 1993 territorial divisions, we are only able to match 86 percent of the communes in the
population census with the 2001 commune survey. After combining the three data sets and
eliminating observations with missing data, we are left with a little less than 1000 observations.
A map of Madagascar with provincial and communal boundaries is shown in Figure 1. Pop-
ulation density is depicted in shades of grey. We see that population is densest in the Central
highlands around the main cities of Antananarivo (the capital city) and Antsirabe. The Eastern
highlands and coast between Toamasina and Fianarantsoa are also heavily populated. This
largely re￿ects climate patterns that make these areas more productive for agriculture. Other
2The 9 communes in question were missed in the ￿rst round of surveys, but the political crisis following the
2001 presidential elections made the work impossible to complete.
11major cities such as Toamasina, Mahajanga, Toliara, and Antsiranana are coastal port cities
with a small rural hinterland surrounding them. The Western and Southwestern parts of the
country are more arid and much less populated.
Descriptive statistics on crime and law enforcement personnel from the commune census are
presented in Table 1. All ￿gures are reported per 100,000 inhabitants. Crime statistics are
averages over the three year period 1999-2001. Of the ￿ve types of criminal activity recorded
in the commune survey, cattle rustling is the most common. An average of 80 or so head of
cattle are stolen on average each year in each commune ￿ an average of 1500 or so head of cattle
per 100,000 inhabitants. This ￿gure is in￿uenced by a number of a small number of very large
outliers where cattle rustling takes place at an ￿industrial￿ level. But the median is still 62 head
of cattle reported stolen each year per 100,000 inhabitants. The high incidence of cattle rustling
may be related to traditional practices of certain ethnic groups. The Bara, one of the dominant
ethnic groups in Southwestern Madagascar, are known cattle thieves because young men are
supposed to prove their manhood by stealing cattle . When they have done so, they are ready
to get married (Ramiarantsoa 1995). The Sakalava have similar customs. Cattle rustling is more
c o m m o ni nt h ew e s t e r np a r to ft h ei s l a n d .T h i sl a r g e l yr e ￿e c t st h ef a c tt h a tt h i sd r i e rp a r to f
the island is most suitable for extensive livestock production, which naturally facilitates cattle
rustling (Smith, Barrett & Box 2001).
Burglaries are the next most common type of crime, with some 43 burglaries on average
per year per 100,000 inhabitants. The average number of reported homicides is higher than the
high US national average from the early 1990￿s: 8.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Fox
& Zawitz 2000). This number is a bit higher than the 1994 national average of 6.4 intentional
homicides reported in Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza (1998). The median number of homicides
is much lower, suggesting that crime is concentrated in certain communes. The geographical
12distribution of murder rates is shown in Figure 2. We see that the highest rates are by and large
found in less densely populated areas.
A high proportion of perpetrators of homicides are found, with a median probability of 67%.
The mean is lower, however, suggesting that ￿nding murderers is more diﬃcult in communes
where the number of homicides is high. The incidence of rape appears low, with less than three
reported cases on average per 100,000 inhabitants. This is likely due to under-reporting bias.
Vehicle theft is extremely rare, re￿ecting the low number of personal vehicles on the island and
the fact that few people know how to drive.
The summary statistics on law enforcement personnel are presented in the second half of
Table 1. Law enforcement personnel are divided into three categories in Madagascar: gendarmes,
police, and quartiers mobiles (literally, ￿mobile quarters￿). Gendarmes and police are responsible
for public security (Ministere de la Justice 1999). The former are primarily posted in rural
communes while the latter are posted in urban areas. Both deal with major crimes like the ones
discussed in this paper. The police are under the State Secretary while the gendarmes are part of
t h eM i n i s t r yo ft h eA r m e dF o r c e s .T h em a j o r i t yo fc o m m u n e sh a v en e i t h e rgendarmes nor police
and must rely on law enforcement assistance from neighboring communes. Quartiers mobiles
are more numerous and more broadly distributed but their mandate is focused on smaller crimes
and misdemeanors. They nonetheless may play a preventive role. Regular army units sometimes
assist the gendarmes in the pursuit of bandits or cattle thieves. The data shows that military
forces are extremely concentrated geographically.3
Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution of law enforcement personnel per 100,000 in-
habitants. Except for a large pocket of low law enforcement density in the Southwest, there
3In some areas, groups organized at the village level enforce traditional laws called dina (U.S. State Department
2002). In our analysis, we also experimented with a dina dummy, but its eﬀect on crime and insecurity is never
signi￿cant. These results are omitted here.
13does not seem to be strong evidence that law enforcement is concentrated in and around cities.
Table 2 provides information on the make-up of Malagasy communes in terms of population,
isolation, public services, and risk factors. The population variables (Table 2, Part A) as well
as the percentage of households with running water, electricity, pump water and toilet (Table 2,
Part B) are from the 1993 census data. The remaining variables are from the commune survey.
We see that median population density is low ￿ 26 inhabitants per square Km. The pro-
portion of migrants in the male population is high ￿ 12% on average. Most active males are
involved in agriculture. Overt unemployment is essentially non-existent. The proportion of
female-headed households is quite high, with an average of 19%.
Table 2 presents summary statistics estimated by Mistiaen et al. (2002) for all communes
of Madagascar. The ￿gures are obtained in two steps. Using a detailed household survey, the
authors ￿rst estimate the relationship between household income and various indicators, such
as housing quality, durables, and the like. The authors then apply the estimated parameters
to population census data and derive a variety of poverty and inequality statistics for each
commune. This method has now been used in numerous countries and has been shown to yield
reliable predictions (e.g. Elbers, Lanjouw & Lanjouw 2003, Elbers, Lanjouw & Lanjouw 2002).
In this paper, we use three statistics: the average household income in the commune; the poverty
headcount index; and the poverty gap. The latter two correspond to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke
index with α =0and α =1 , respectively, and hence are denoted FGT0 and FGT1.
The majority of the population is considered poor or very poor, with roughly 73% of the
population behind the poverty line. Less than 10% is regarded as rich according to Madagascar
standards. There are also large income diﬀerence across communes: the coeﬃcient of variation
of average household income is 0.59. The poverty gap is reported as well. It measures the depth
of poverty. Mistiaen et al. (2002) also report a Gini coeﬃcient for each commune. Inequality
14within communes is moderate, with an average of .36 and a standard deviation of .05. We only
use the ￿rst three in the regression analysis.
Table 2 also reports the available information on isolation and the provision of public services.
The average travel time to a major city is high: 29 hours, with a median of 14 hours. This
includes travel time as well as waiting time for public transportation, and is an average of dry
and rainy season. This measure is a more useful measure of isolation than either cost or distance,
which fail to account for the often long distances that must be covered on foot to reach a road
with public transportation. A third of surveyed communes are located 6.5 hours or less from a
major city; one third is located 25 hours away or more. The average commune is located 5 hours
from the nearest hospital and 2.4 hours from the nearest secondary school. Medians, however,
are much smaller. The percentages of households with electricity or running water are quite
low. Less than one fourth of households have a toilet. We also report the average beer price in
the communes. Malagasy beer is produced at a single location in the central highlands, near
the city of Antsirabe, and is transported from there to all parts of the country. We use it as a
yardstick to measure the cost of living in terms of manufactures.
Risk factors and other characteristics are listed in the third panel of the table. Crime may
go up when climatic events force people to abandon their homes. The occurrence of cyclones is
fairly high: over the three year period 1999-2001, on average, communes experienced a cyclone
0.6 years. This means that in any single year, the probability of being hit by at least one cyclone
is 20%. The likelihood of bridges and roads being washed out during at least part of the year
is twice as high, with a 40% probability in any single year. Such occurrences constitute another
measure of isolation as it hinders movements by law enforcement personnel.
Using the data at hand, we construct an index of ethnic fractionalization. The literature
has indeed suggested that con￿icts of all nature ￿ including crime ￿ may be related to ethnic
15diversity (e.g. Easterly & Levine 1997, Collier & Hoeﬄer 1998, Smith, Barrett & Box 2001). Let
the share of ethnic group j in the population of commune i be written σij. The fractionalization
index Fi is simply a Simpson index based on the population shares of various ethnic groups:4





The fractionalization index is also the polarization index proposed by Duclos, Estaban & Ray
(2002), equation (6), with their parameter α =1 . If the whole population belongs to the same
ethnic group, Fi =0 . If the population is equally divided into many tiny groups, Fi tends to
1. The average index is 0.32, which corresponds to a moderate degree of fractionalization. We
also record the presence of Bara or Sakalava in the commune. As discussed earlier, these two
e t h n i cg r o u p sh a v eat r a d i t i o no fc a t t l er u s t l i n g .O n ef o u r t ho ft h ec o m m u n e sh a v es o m eB a r a
or Sakalava.
Other risk factors include a history of political violence. Crime and violence indeed tend
to display a fair degree of inertia (Blume 2002). Some 6% of communes have experienced riots
or looting since independence. We suspect these communes to be less secure as the population
might be against the authority and more willing to harbor criminals. The mining of precious
stones and minerals and the presence of non-native residents provide easily identi￿able targets
for crime. We follow Rephann (1999) and include tourism as a possible draw for criminals and
risk factor. The presence of large numbers of livestock in the commune similarly may attract
cattle theft. We see that Madagascar is well stocked in zebu cattle, with a median of 2500 heads
of cattle per commune. Variance is quite large, and some communes have massive herds. The
4The survey records ethnicity into 19 distinct categories. Like all de￿nition of ethnicity, these categories are
based on a somewhat arbitrary combination of phenotype, dialect, and place of origin. There is also a residual
category ￿other￿. For the sake of constructing the index, we assumed that the ￿other￿ population is divided equally
into three distinct ethnic groups.
16number of sheep and goats is smaller but also heavily concentrated geographically.5
To summarize, the variables listed in Table 2 cover essentially all major determinants of crime
identi￿ed in the literature: proportion of males and of migrants in the population; poverty and
inequality; crime opportunities measured by the number of livestock, the mining of precious
stones, tourism, and the percentage of non-Malagasy population (Becker 1968); labor participa-
tion measured by the unemployment rate and the proportion of population engaged in agriculture
and livestock (e.g. Ehrlich 1973, Tauchen, Witte & Griesinger 1994); literacy as a proxy for edu-
cation (Ehrlich 1975); the percentage of female-headed households (Glaeser & Sacerdote 1999);
the history of violence and criminal inertia measured by the riot dummy (Glaeser, Sacerdote &
Scheinkman 1996); social interactions measured by ethnic fractionalization (e.g. Dilulio 1996, Le-
derman, Loayza & Menendez 2000, Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman 1996); and social practices
measured by the Bara/Sakalava dummy. We also have data on law enforcement personnel (e.g.
Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza 1998, Levitt 1997).
In addition to these standard explanatory variables, we have information about distance
to the nearest town and the incidence of cut roads. Together with population density, these
three variables constitute our measures of isolation. The main objective of the remainder of this
paper is to ascertain whether isolation has an eﬀect on crime independent of all the standard
explanations for crime.
4. Empirical analysis of crime incidence
Now that we have a better idea of the area under study, we turn to the determinants of criminal
activity. We begin with univariate non-parametric regressions between crime rate and distance
5regional customs which forbid raising or eating these animals.
17to the nearest city, measured in hours of travel time.6 Results are displayed in Figure 4, together
with 95% asymptotic con￿dence intervals. Results show that crime rates tend to increase with
distance from the nearest city. The eﬀect is particularly strong for cattle theft and homicides.
For rapes and burglaries, the regression curve cannot be estimated at low distances, probably
because the eﬀect of distance is compounded by other factors. We repeat the exercise for crime
rates and population density. The results, presented in Figure 5, indicate a generally negative
relationship between the two: communes with more people per square km have less crime. The
eﬀect is again strongest for cattle theft and homicides. For rapes and burglaries, the relationship
cannot be estimated precisely at high levels of population density. While indicative, these results
need to be con￿rmed by multivariate analysis.
We now turn to a relatively sparse multivariate speci￿cation that includes only travel time to
the nearest city, population density, and controls for poverty, inequality, and location. Latitude
and longitude are included as regressors to control for North-South and East-West diﬀerentials.7
The estimator is generalized negative binomial regression with Zi = Xi. The dependent variable
is the total number of crimes in the three years prior to the survey. Population is controlled for
as an oﬀset variable, so that estimated coeﬃcients measure the eﬀect on the crime rate.
Results are presented in Table 3 for ￿ve categories of crime. Because there are very few cases
of vehicle theft reported in the commune survey, we can only estimate the model with a reduced
number of regressors. Results show that, except for vehicle theft, crime rises with distance from
the nearest city. In Madagascar, vehicle theft is the only form of urban theft recorded in the
survey. We also ￿nd that cattle theft and homicides are more frequent in communes with a
6We use an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.6. In the Figures, we trim the 5% of observations with
the lowest kernel frequency in order to improve readability. Without trimming, graphs tend to be dominated by
very large con￿dence intervals at either end of the regression curve.
7Latitude and longitude enter in decimal degrees. The West and South of the island are drier. Western
communes tended to be settled by populations from the African mainland while Eastern communes were settled
primarily by Malays. The Northern tip of the country was, for a while, ruled by pirates.
18low population density and hence where people live further apart from each other. In contrast,
burglaries and vehicle theft occur in more densely populated areas (the eﬀect is not signi￿cant
for burglaries, however).
Poverty and inequality variables are often signi￿cant, but their eﬀect is diﬀerent depending
o nt h et y p eo fc r i m e .As i m i l a r￿nding is reported by Fafchamps & Minten (2002). We ￿nd that
the crime rate is higher in communes with a higher average income and a higher poverty gap,
i.e., in communes with more inequality. Cattle theft shows a diﬀerent pattern, with less crime
when the poverty gap is large.8 Location variables are also shown to be important determinants,
w i t hm o r ec r i m ei nt h eN o r t ha n dW e s ta n ds t r o n gd i ﬀerences across provinces regarding the
incidence of various types of crime.
Results regarding the eﬀect of distance to the nearest city are extremely robust. We obtain
similar results if we use alternative de￿nitions of distance. Table 4 reports results obtained using
transport cost or physical distance instead of travel time. Other regressors are as in Table 3.
With the exception of rapes where the coeﬃcient is no longer signi￿cant, results are similar to
those reported in Table 3. Virtually identical results are also obtained if some of the regressors
are dropped or if alternative estimators (e.g., OLS, Tobit) are used.
It is conceivable that our results are due to omitted variable bias: determinants of crime that
are not included in the regression could be correlated with distance. To address this possibility,
we reestimate the model with additional controls. The ￿rst set of additional regressors controls
for population composition, particularly the proportion of men and migrants in the population.
The next set of controls focuses on living conditions, such as sanitation and electricity. From
the discussion in the introduction we suspect that livestock plays an important role in crime
8In regressions not reported here, we also experimented with alternative measures of poverty and inequality.
These measures are based on focus group responses to 2001 questions regarding the proportion of commune
residents falling in diﬀerent income groups. These variables are always jointly signi￿cant. They con￿rm that
crime is higher when the proportion of poor residents is higher.
19because of cattle rustling. We therefore control for livestock population as well as the presence of
specialized herders. The third set could be described as ￿attractive nuisance￿, that is, magnets for
criminal activity, such as the extraction of precious stones or metals or the presence of tourists.
Finally, we include measures of shocks faced by the population either recently (cyclones, cut
roads), or in the more distant past (riots). We also allow the crime rate to vary with population
and area separately, rather with population density which is the ratio of the two.9
The results, presented in Table 5, show that, if anything, adding more controls reinforces
t h er o l eo fi s o l a t i o n ,p o v e r t y ,a n di n e q u a l i t y .W ea l s oa d dt h en u m b e ro fy e a r si nw h i c hr o a d so r
bridges were cut by weather conditions. This regressor can be construed as capturing isolation
shocks. We ￿nd that it is signi￿cant for homicides.
Contrary to expectations, none of the crime measures is found to be proportional to total
population: communes with a larger population have a signi￿cantly lower crime rate in all four
categories. The eﬀect is strongest for cattle theft.10 We also ￿nd that, for three of the four
crime categories, the crime rate increases with the area of the commune. Together, these results
con￿rm that larger, less populated communes have higher crime rates. This constitutes further
evidence that the concentration of population is not driving crime in Madagascar. Crime is thus
more prevalent in areas with low population density and located further away from a major city.
These results con￿rm that, in the case of Madagascar, crime is associated with low population
and rural isolation, not with urbanization.
Many of the standard explanatory variables have the expected sign and are signi￿cant in
at least some of the regressions. Communes with proportionally more migrants have more
homicides and cattle theft. As Glaeser & Sacerdote (1999) ￿nd in US cities, a higher percentage
9But population continues to enter the regression as oﬀset variable.
10For cattle theft, the coeﬃcient of population is less than -1, suggesting that the absolute number of cattle
theft falls with the absolute number of people in the commune.
20of female headed households is associated with more homicides. Cattle rustling is higher in
communes with more cattle. Communes with tourism or mining of precious stones have more
crime. Electricity is associated with more rapes while the proportion of households equipped
with a toilet is associated with a reduction in cattle theft. Ethnic fractionalization has a positive
eﬀect on cattle rustling and homicides. Many of the forces driving crime elsewhere in the world
are thus at work in Madagascar.
5. Deterrence
As discussed in Section 2, the negative relationship we ￿nd between crime and isolation may be
due to insuﬃcient law enforcement and hence to low deterrence. To investigate this possibility,
we turn to equation (2.4) and include the number of law enforcement personnel as an additional
regressor. Results, partly shown at the bottom of Table 7, indicate that the presence of law
enforcement personnel is associated with more crime, not less. (The eﬀect is just below 10%
signi￿cance for cattle theft.) We also ￿nd that controlling for law enforcement does not alter
our main conclusion that crime is higher in more isolated areas.
These results are nevertheless suspect because of possible endogeneity between law enforce-
ment Li and unobservables in the crime regression (Ehrlich & Brower 1987). To correct for this
bias, we instrument Li using variables measuring the attractiveness of the commune to police
personnel and their family. Instruments include: distance to nearest school and hospital and
average beer price (an indicator of cost of living for manufactures).11 These variables are likely
to aﬀect the placement of law enforcement personnel, but should have no direct eﬀect on crime
once we include all the additional controls appearing in Table 5.
11The price of a standard-size beer bottle was chosen as indicator of the price of manufactures because it is a
perfectly homegeneous commodity that can be found in all communes of the country. In Madagascar, all bottled
beer originates from a single manufacturing plant in the Central highlands.
21Table 6 reports the results from various endogeneity and exogeneity tests.12 We apply two
separate endogeneity tests: a standard Hausman test and a Davidson-MacKinnon test. Surpris-
ingly, we see that, except for burglaries, we cannot reject the assumption that law enforcement is
exogenous. Given the risk of incorrect inference, we nevertheless instruments law enforcement.
To test the validity of our instruments, we ￿rst use a Wald overidenti￿cation test. We cannot
reject the hypothesis that instruments are exogenous in all the crime regressions.13 Secondly
(second part of Table 6), we test that the instruments explain enough of the variation in law
enforcement. Results show that, with the exception of quartiers mobiles, our instruments are
jointly signi￿cant determinants of law enforcement. Moreover the R2 statistics of the instru-
menting equations are reasonable without being so high that they would suggest over￿tting.
We then reestimate the full model, including instrumented law enforcement as additional
regressor. By analogy with the method proposed by Rivers & Vuong (1988) for binary data
and by Smith & Blundell (1986) for censored data, we follow Wooldridge (2002) and instrument
Li by including the actual variable as well as the estimated residuals from the reduced-form
instrumenting equation of Li. Experimenting with various categories of law enforcement per-
sonnel, we ￿nd consistent results throughout. Here we only report estimates obtained using
total law enforcement.14 Results, presented in Table 7, show that, contrary to expectations, law
enforcement has a signi￿cant positive eﬀect on crime in two regressions and is positive albeit
non-signi￿cant in the other two. We also ￿nd that law enforcement has an even higher eﬀect on
crime after instrumentation: to the extent that endogeneity is present, it tends to underestimate
12In the Hausman test, the two covariances used in the test are based on a common estimate of the disturbance
variance, that of the fully eﬃcient estimator.
13This tests is conducted by ￿rst estimating the crime regressions using 2SLS to instrument law enforcement.
The residuals from this regression are then regressed on all the instruments and a joint signi￿cance test is performed
(Wooldridge 2002).
14This variable is constructed as the number of gendarmes and policemen plus the number of quartiers mobiles
divided by 5. Since there are many more quartier mobiles, if we do not divide quartiers mobiles by 5, they swamp
other categories. Very similar results are obtained if we simply sum all law enforcement personnel but we feel
there results present a more accurate picture of actual law enforcement eﬀort.
22the positive impact of law enforcement personnel on reported crime.
This is an unusual result. Other studies typically ￿nd a negative relationship between law
enforcement and crime (e.g. Barak 2000, Demombynes & Ozler 2002, Ehrlich 1996, Fajnzylber,
Lederman & Loayza 1998, Levitt 1996, Levitt 1997, Levitt 1998). Most of these studies, however,
come from developed countries where a minimum level of law enforcement is provided everywhere
and crime reporting is reasonably accurate, even in isolated areas. This is unlikely to be the
case in Madagascar: police presence may have a strong eﬀect on the reporting of crime. If,
in addition, policing has little or no eﬀect on crime itself, the reporting eﬀect will dominate.
In this case, more crime is reported where law enforcement personnel is present.15 This is our
favored explanation for our results. Instrumentation does not eliminate this possibility because
the instruments chosen are associated with the presence of law enforcement personnel net of
the eﬀect of crime itself ￿ and thus with more reporting. Why the Malagasy law enforcement
personnel does not have a more pronounced eﬀect on crime prevention is unclear. Ministere de
la Justice (1999) presents ample circumstantial evidence that the Malagasy police is notoriously
ineﬀective at preventing crime. Bribing policemen appears to be required for them to investigate
crimes. Prisons are also alledgedly porous, with many criminals bribing their way out of jail.
Rasamoelina (2000) provides evidence that law enforcement personnel occasionally collude with
criminals, or choose not to intervene. We revisit some of these issues below.16
Including law enforcement weakens distance coeﬃcients somewhat: travel time remains pos-
15A cynical view of policing may ascribe excess criminality to the presence of ill-disciplined law enforcement
personnel. Although lack of discipline has been documented in a few cases (Ministere de la Justice 1999), it
is unlikely that the small numbers of law enforcement personnel be responsible for very large increase in crime
implied by the coeﬃcients.
16As pointed out by one referee, it is possible that the number of gendarmes and police does not provide an
accurate picture of law enforcement eﬀort. Law enforcement personnel operating in more remote areas may be
less eﬀective because of the diﬃculty involved in policing a very large area. If true, this would mean that law
enforcement is less eﬀective in isolated communes.
We do not dispute this idea. Given the log form of our regression (both law enforcement, area, and population
appear in logs), these eﬀects are already captured in the regression presented in Table 7. A complete treatment
of this important issue is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
23itive in all regression but is signi￿cant only in two. However, the relationship between crime rate
and population becomes even more negative. If under-reporting is the correct explanation for
the positive association between police presence and crime, then the fact that more isolated, less
densely populated areas are more crime prone cannot be due to under-reporting: if anything,
isolation and low population density should reduce crime reporting. The fact that isolation vari-
ables by and large remain signi￿cant suggests that the association between isolation and crime
is not an artifact of incorrect reporting.
6. Subjective insecurity
The results presented thus far indicate that law enforcement personnel have no identi￿able eﬀect
on crime prevention. One possible explanation is that Malagasy law enforcement is ineﬀective.
This claim is made, for instance, by Ministere de la Justice (1999), Root (1993), and The World
Bank (1999) who argue that Malagasy law enforcement personnel are unmotivated and corrupt.
A gentler interpretation is that the bene￿cial eﬀect of law enforcement is entirely obscured by
crime under-reporting in communes without policing. To investigate this possibility, we turn to
a subjective measure of insecurity collected in the commune census.
Respondents to the census questionnaire ￿ a focus group of commune residents ￿ were asked
to rank the level of insecurity in their commune on a scale from 1 to 5.17 Half the communes
were ranked as average; 19-20% were ranked either moderately bad or moderately good, and
t h er e s tw e r er a n k e da se i t h e rv e r yb a do rv e r yg o o d . Ah i g hr a n k i n gm e a n st h ec o m m u n ei s
very insecure. The geographical distribution of the subjective rankings suggests that Western
communes with low population density feel the most insecure.
Although subjective, this ranking oﬀers the advantage that it is not subject to crime under-
17If we regress the insecurity variable on (instrumented) crime statistics, we ￿nd that insecurity responds mostly
to cattle theft (t-ratio of 6.32) and burglaries (t-ratio of 2.82).
24reporting. Using ordered probit, we regress it on the same set of regressors as in Table 7. Results
are reported in Table 8. Law enforcement is again instrumented using the Smith and Blundell
(1986) method. Results show no relationship between the presence of law enforcement personnel
in the commune and the feeling of insecurity of residents. This is true whichever law enforcement
category we use. This con￿rms that law enforcement personnel has little or no eﬀect on crime
prevention.
Regarding population and isolation variables, results are by and large consistent with earlier
￿ndings. Travel time to the nearest town has a strong positive eﬀect on subjective insecurity.
Commune area and population have the expected sign but are not signi￿cant.18 This further
con￿rms that isolation and low population density are strongly associated with a deep sense
of insecurity. The proportion of men in the population and the proportion of migrants among
males are strong determinants of insecurity. The presence of Bara or Sakalava in the commune
also raises insecurity.19
7. Determinants of law enforcement
We have accomplished our main objective, which was to test the relationship between isolation
a n dc r i m e .I ns od o i n g ,w eh a v ec o m eu pw i t hp u z z l i n ge v i d e n c eo fap o s i t i v el i n kb e t w e e nl a w
enforcement and crime. Because this is an important issue in its own right, we also examine the
factors that determine the eﬀectiveness of Malagasy law enforcement in ￿ghting crime. We do
so in two steps. In this section we investigate whether law enforcement personnel locates where
crime is more prevalent. Failure to do so would indicate that the government is not responsive
18They become signi￿cant if the additional controls are dropped.
19Strangely, we ￿nd that communes with a high literacy rate feel more insecure, possibly because literacy makes
people long more for security. Another possible explanation is failed expectations. Literacy raises expectations,
especially among young people. When these raised expectations are not met by real economic opportunities, some
turn to crime. Yet another possible interpretation is that literacy is correlated with income and higher incomes
attract more crime. This issue deserves more investigation.
25to local crime levels in its geographical allocation of gendarmes and police. In the next section
we investigate whether law enforcement personnel has a signi￿cant impact on crime resolution.
If the police does not catch criminals, its deterrent eﬀect is unlikely to be strong.
Regarding geographical placement, we examine the three categories of law enforcement per-
sonnel separately and together.20 Because of censoring at 0, we rely on censored least absolute
deviation as our estimator. To improve eﬃciency, we adjust the quartile depending on the
amount of censoring in the data (higher quartile if more censoring). Crime incidence is in-
strumented to control for possible endogeneity bias. By analogy with other limited dependent
variable estimators, we correct for endogeneity by including actual crime ￿gures together with
residuals from the instrumenting equations. Instruments include: the proportion of males in
the population; the proportion of migrants and agricultural workers in the male population;
the proportion of female headed households; and various risk factors such as livestock, tourism,
ethnic fractionalization, and the presence of Bara and Sakalava. These variables can reasonably
be thought to aﬀect police placement only through their eﬀect on crime.
The validity of instruments is tested in Table 9. First, we ￿nd that crime variables test
endogenous in all four regressions. Second, in all cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the instruments are exogenous in the law enforcement regressions. Finally, instruments are
jointly signi￿cant in three of the four crime regressions. We do not have suitable instruments
for rape. Consequently, rape is omitted from the placement regressions. As the reported R2
values indicate, we are able to explain a sizeable share of the variation in crime. We also see that
over￿tting is not a concern in spite of the relatively large number of instruments. Instrumenting
the three main categories of crime should be suﬃcient to control for crime incidence.
Table 10 summarizes the regressions of police placement. Two political factors are included
20In the joint regression, we give quartiers mobiles a lower weight (0.2) to re￿ect their low involvement in
￿ghting crime.
26in the regressions: a history of riots in the commune and the proportion of non-Malagasy in the
population (e.g. Blanchy 1995, Fafchamps & Minten 2001). At least one instrumented crime
variables is signi￿cant in each regression, but their eﬀect varies across types of law enforcement
personnel. Homicides raise the number of gendarmes but only have a negative, non-signi￿cant
eﬀect on policemen and quartiers mobiles. Burglaries, in contrast, raise the number of policemen
and quartiers mobiles but lower that of gendarmes. Cattle theft, in contrast, only raises the
number of gendarmes. Because the eﬀects of homicides and burglaries on gendarmes and po-
licemen tend to cancel each other, cattle theft is also the only form of crime to have a signi￿cant
eﬀect on the combined placement of law enforcement personnel.
Isolation has a signi￿cant eﬀect on policing. We ￿nd that isolation tends to raise the number
of gendarmes. This was expected since they are in charge of rural law and order. As predicted
by our model, law enforcement presence is an increasing function of population, albeit less than
proportionally in all cases. It also increases with commune area. Taken together, these results
imply that isolated communes and communes with a lower population density have a larger
number of law enforcement personnel per inhabitant: the positive relationship between crime,
isolation, and population density is therefore unlikely to be due to underpolicing.
Attractiveness variables are jointly signi￿cant in all cases but the sign and signi￿cance of
individual controls is not very robust in the sense that they are sensitive to small changes in the
list of regressors. For this reason, we do not discuss them further.
Perhaps the placement of law enforcement personnel responds not to actual crime but to
feelings of insecurity. To investigate this possibility, we repeat the analysis controlling for the
sense of insecurity instead of crime. As before, insecurity is instrumented to control for endo-
geneity. The list of instruments is the same as for crime. Results are not reported here to save
space. We ￿nd that the placement of gendarmes is quite responsive to feelings of insecurity. The
27placement of other categories of law enforcement personnel, however, is not.
8. Solving crime
We have seen that law enforcement personnel does, to some extent, locate where they are most
needed to ￿ght crime. We have also seen that their deterrent eﬀect on crime itself is non-existent
and their eﬀect on feelings of insecurity is not signi￿cant. Does this imply that Malagasy law
enforcement personnel has no deterrence eﬀect because they are ineﬀective at ￿ghting crime?
To investigate this possibility, we examine whether policing has an eﬀect on crime resolu-
tion. Our two measures are the proportion of recovered cattle and the proportion of captured
murderers. Given that these two measures are only available in communes where a crime was
perpetrated, we estimate a Heckman selection model. Because the information content of the
dependent variable is less, we estimate a sparse version of the model.21 The variables aﬀecting
the occurrence of crime are those reported in Table 5. We are primarily interested in the eﬀect
of law enforcement on the probability of resolution, conditional on a crime having taken place.
Some of our results are shown in Table 11; others are omitted to save on space. We ￿nd
that the eﬀectiveness of law enforcement varies between the diﬀerent branches. The presence
of quartiers mobiles has no eﬀect on the resolution of cattle theft and murder. These ￿ndings
are consistent with their subsidiary role. Police and gendarmes help solve homicides, although
Table 11 the eﬀect is not signi￿cant. Only gendarmes have an eﬀect on the recovery of stolen
cattle.
These results suggest that law enforcement personnel is not entirely useless: it does locate
partly in response to crime and it apprehends some of the criminals. But we ￿nd no evidence
that law enforcement personnel either deter criminals or increase the sense of security among
21Adding more regressors would reduce the likelihood of omitted variable bias but is also biased towards ￿nding
no eﬀect of law enforcement on crime resolution.
28residents. These ￿ndings are in line with the critiques of Malagasy police presented in Ministere
de la Justice (1999) and Root (1993)
9. Conclusion
Using data from a commune census in Madagascar, we investigate whether crime incidence is
associated with urbanization or isolation. Theory predicts that areas of large human concen-
tration should have more crime because of more potential victims and more opportunities to
gain from crime. For similar reasons, areas with better transport to urban centers should suﬀer
more crime. A few forces operate in the opposite direction, however, such as the capacity to
avoid detection and the lack of trust among neighboring communities that results from being
insulated from the rest of the world.
Results show a strong positive association between crime, the feeling of insecurity, isolation,
and low population density. Communes that are the least populated and furthest away from
major cities harbor the most criminal activity. This ￿nding stands in stark contrast with the
common perception that urbanization drives crime (e.g. Glaeser & Sacerdote 1999, Grogger &
Willis 1998, Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza 2000).22 Our results suggest that, in the case of
Madagascar, the construction of roads to remote areas may reduce crime and insecurity, not
the contrary. They also invite researchers to question the nature of guerilla uprisings and their
relationship with crime and isolation (Collier 2000): if isolated regions have more banditry, they
are also more likely to harbor armed insurgent and terrorist groups, especially if crime is used
to ￿nance insurgency.
Why crime and isolation are correlated remains unclear. One possibility is that isolation pro-
22It also diﬀers from the work of Demombynes & Ozler (2002) who ￿nd a positive correlation between crime
and population density in South Africa. However, Madagascar may be more representative of underdeveloped
countries than South Africa.
29vides safe harbor and passage for criminals, hence reducing the eﬀectiveness of law enforcement.
Another possibility, suggested by the work of Smith, Barrett & Box (2001), is that isolation
nurtures distrust among diﬀerent ethnic groups. This distrust then manifests itself by raiding
cattle and property (shops, granaries), occasionally accompanied by homicide and rape. Yet
another possibility is that the dearth of entertainment alternatives makes alcohol consumption
higher in isolated area, with a by-product of brawls, homicides, and rape. These issues deserve
further research.
Regarding other determinants of crime, our results con￿rm many ￿ndings obtained using ei-
ther US data or international comparisons. The presence of males and migrants in the population
increases crime. So does the proportion of female-headed households (Glaeser & Sacerdote 1999).
Ethnic fractionalization is associated with more crime as well (e.g. Fajnzylber, Lederman &
Loayza 2000, Dilulio 1996, Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman 1996). Crime opportunities, such
as tourism or a large livestock population, raise crime. Rephann (1999) ￿nds a similar eﬀect
of tourism in US counties. Put diﬀerently, the Madagascar data used here behaves like other
data sets except for the eﬀect of isolation. The positive correlation observed between crime and
urbanization in the US may have to do with the diﬀerent nature of crime, primarily the drug
trade. To avoid easy detection and be close to demand, dealers must be located in urban centers.
There is, however, an important way in which our results diﬀer from other studies: the lack
of deterrent eﬀect from policing. We ￿nd that law enforcement personnel tends to be placed
in areas of high crime incidence and that it solves a signi￿cant proportion of reported crimes.
But we also ￿nd that law enforcement has no eﬀect on perceptions of insecurity and that the
presence of law enforcement personnel has a positive eﬀect on reported crime. We attribute this
eﬀect to under-reporting of crime in communes without police presence. It remains unclear why
Malagasy police has no discernible eﬀect on crime prevention and deterrence, albeit some authors
30have suggested that law enforcement in Madagascar is particularly corrupt and ineﬀective (e.g.
Ministere de la Justice 1999, Root 1993). This issue deserves more attention.
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37Table 1. Descriptive statistics on crime and police
All figures reported per 100,000 inhabitants
Std. dev. Median Mean A. Crime incidence (average 1999-2001)
5754 62.0 1496.0 Number of stolen cattle
1074 6.1 323.2 Number of stolen cattle found
38% 22% 33% Proportion of recovered catte (if stolen)
2 0.0 0.2 Number of stolen vehicles
97 7.9 42.8 Number of burglaries
20 2.1 8.5 Number of homicides
27 0.0 7.0 Number of murderers found
44% 67% 56% Proportion of murderers found (if murder)
10 0.0 2.9 Number of rapes
B. Law enforcement personnel
105 0.0 46.2 Gendarmes
83 0.0 12.9 Police
609 362.9 478.1 Quartier mobiles
613 413.7 537.1 Total
271 0.0 25.0 MilitaryData Table 2. Characteristics of communes
Std. dev. Median Mean source A. Population characteristics
23965 7873 10532 pop. census Total population
754 26 131 pop. census Population density
1% 50% 50% pop. census Percentage of men in total population
11 8 12 pop. census Percentage of migrants in male population
19 75 70 pop. census Percentage of men in agriculture or livestock
6 18 19 pop. census Percentage of female headed households
B. Poverty and inequality
190491 295181 324880 Mintian et al Average household income in the commune (1993)
15.3% 75.4% 72.6% Mintian et al FGT0 (number of poor) in commune (1993)
0.120 0.329 0.338 Mintian et al FGT1 (poverty gap) in commune (1993)
0.0518 0.3648 0.3615 Mintian et al Gini coefficient
C. Isolation and public services
45.0 14.0 28.7 commune Travel time to nearest city (in hours) (*)
10.3 2.0 5.3 commune Travel time to nearest hospital (in hours)
8.3 0.0 2.4 commune Travel time to nearest secondary school (in hours)
7.8 0.0 2.4 pop. census Percentage of households with electricity
3.6 0.0 0.9 pop. census Percentage of households with running water
12.9 0.2 5.6 pop. census Percentage of households with pump water
28.4 7.4 22.7 pop. census Percentage of households with toilet
1317 5000 5244 commune Average beer price (an indicator of cost of living)
D. Other characteristics
0.8 0 0.6 commune Number of years with cyclone in last three years
1.3 1 1.2 commune Number of years road was cut in last three years
0.25 0.29 0.32 commune Ethnic fractionalization index
0% 24% commune Presence of Bara or Sakalava
0% 6% commune Commune had riots since independence
0% 20% commune Precious stones or gold mined in commune
0% 43% commune Tourist attraction present in commune
0.29% 0.01% 0.06% commune Percentage of non-Malagasy population
31974 2588 6644 commune Number of zebu cattle







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 5. Determinants of the crime rate with additional controls
Rapes Homicides Burglaries Cattle theft (estimator is generalized negative binomial regression)
z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. Unit Isolation
2.88 0.254 3.36 0.167 2.04 0.154 1.97 0.155 log Travel time to nearest major city
2.20 0.293 1.59 0.177 -2.47 -0.191 3.88 0.306 log Area
-2.97 -0.491 -5.72 -0.694 -3.67 -0.445 -10.06 -1.376 log Population
Poverty and inequality
-0.32 -0.017 1.11 1.892 3.34 3.903 1.38 2.043 log Average household income in commune
-0.24 -0.778 0.95 2.270 2.61 5.500 3.10 5.916 share Headcount index (FGT0) in commune
2.70 7.707 1.32 3.051 1.65 4.323 -0.21 -0.633 index Poverty gap (FGT1) in commune
Location and province dummies (Fianarantsoa is omitted province)
0.72 0.430 -1.09 -0.538 0.47 0.188 -4.44 -1.690 yes=1 Antananarivo
1.53 0.808 0.51 0.143 4.22 1.520 -4.20 -2.180 yes=1 Toamasina
1.06 0.822 -0.69 -0.495 2.33 1.163 -3.71 -1.957 yes=1 Mahajanga
1.84 1.405 -1.41 -0.736 -2.12 -0.672 -2.68 -0.963 yes=1 Toliara
-0.26 -0.208 -0.51 -0.227 4.13 2.336 -4.37 -3.051 yes=1 Antsiranana
0.79 0.086 -1.17 -0.203 -2.82 -0.210 -4.85 -0.368 degree East
1.74 0.249 0.65 0.067 0.54 0.036 4.57 0.342 degree North
Additional controls
0.35 3.818 0.24 0.009 -2.23 -0.092 -0.42 -3.925 % Percentage of men in total population
1.38 0.019 2.07 19.818 -1.69 -14.891 2.75 0.023 % Percentage of migrants in male population
-1.77 -0.012 2.23 0.016 1.06 0.010 1.40 0.007 % Percentage of men in agriculture or livestock
1.28 2.008 2.43 0.031 -0.93 -0.015 -0.16 -0.003 % Percentage of female headed households
-2.19 -0.016 0.06 0.000 -1.32 -0.008 2.38 0.017 % Percentage of households with running/pump water
0.76 0.004 -1.30 -0.005 -0.29 -0.001 -3.49 -0.015 % Percentage of households with toilet
2.96 0.057 1.16 0.050 1.30 0.017 0.09 0.002 % Percentage of households with electricity
0.55 0.022 -0.26 -0.002 -0.71 -0.004 4.03 0.189 log Number of zebu cattle
1.19 0.211 1.11 0.034 3.15 0.092 1.55 0.037 log Number of sheep and goats
1.42 0.347 1.81 0.484 -1.00 -0.382 2.71 1.076 index Ethnic fractionalization index
0.75 0.018 0.79 0.215 -0.88 -0.160 1.22 0.188 yes=1 Presence of Bara or Sakalava
0.82 0.181 1.50 0.222 0.57 0.097 2.92 0.597 yes=1 Precious stones or gold mined in commune
-1.18 -0.629 0.54 0.080 2.18 0.296 1.27 0.178 yes=1 Tourist attraction present in commune
. -0.496 0.10 0.533 -1.19 -0.305 -0.10 -0.017 % Percentage of non-Malagasy population
-1.89 -0.630 0.52 0.127 1.93 0.451 0.25 0.074 yes=1 Commune had riots since independence
0.94 0.071 1.70 0.083 1.15 0.072 -0.08 -0.005 # years Number of years road was cut in last 3 years
-0.63 -0.103 1.12 0.122 1.43 0.112 1.13 0.111 # years Number of years with cyclones
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 log Population (offset variable)
-2.12 -49.937 -1.92 -40.135 -2.99 -46.649 -1.47 -31.083 Intercept
977 977 975 971 Number of observations
0.080 0.085 0.038 0.071 Pseudo R-squared
Since all regressions correct for population size as an offset variable, coefficient estimates measure the effect of regressors on the crime rate.
All regressions allow for the dependence of the variance of the negative binomial distribution on all the regressors; results not shown to save space.Table 6. Endogeneity and exogeneity tests for law enforcement
Rapes Homicides Burglaries Cattle theft A. Crime regressions
p-value test stat. p-value test stat. p-value test stat. p-value test stat. test Test that law enforcement is endogenous:
0.1188 16.65 0.3453 12.25 0.0098 24.78 0.2911 11.92 Chi-sq(9) Hausman test
0.4560 -0.75 0.1100 -1.6 0.0840 -1.73 0.3770 -0.88 t Davidson MacKinnon test
Wald test that instruments are exogenous in
0.1785 3.4400 0.1185 4.2650 0.1186 4.2630 0.7512 0.5721 Chi-sq(2) the crime regressions (overidentification test)
All three (1) Quartiers mobiles Police Gendarmes B. Instrumenting regressions
p-value test stat. p-value test stat. p-value test stat. p-value test stat. F-test that instruments are jointly significant in
0.0015 5.17 0.1296 1.89 0.0003 6.33 0.0378 2.82 F(3,N) instrumenting regressions for law enforcement
0.266 0.266 0.288 0.256 R-square
(1) When combining all three law enforcement personnel, 'quartiers mobiles' are given a weight of 0.2 to capture their lesser involvement in solving crime.
(2) Testing total law enforcement personnel. Similar results are obtained for other categories of law enforcement personnel.
(3) Using total law enforcement.Table 7. Determinants of the crime rate, controlling for law enforcement
Rapes Homicides Burglaries Cattle theft (estimator is generalized negative binomial regression)
z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. Unit Law enforcement
1.14 0.878 0.97 0.433 2.20 1.160 3.35 1.859 log Number of law enforcement personnel
-0.92 -0.731 -0.78 -0.348 -1.78 -0.949 -3.13 -1.738 Residuals from instrumenting equation
Isolation
1.86 0.194 2.58 0.146 1.14 0.098 0.87 0.067 log Travel time to nearest major city
1.17 0.215 1.64 0.121 -3.58 -0.355 1.92 0.174 log Area
-2.19 -0.888 -3.69 -0.880 -3.80 -1.039 -7.84 -2.268 log Population
Poverty and inequality
-0.12 -0.328 0.39 0.652 0.62 1.200 -1.42 -2.915 log Average household income in commune
-0.53 -1.722 1.07 1.864 2.27 5.156 1.98 3.854 share Headcount index (FGT0) in commune
0.65 3.341 0.21 0.676 -0.41 -1.644 -2.53 -9.659 index Poverty gap (FGT1) in commune
Location and province dummies (Fianarantsoa is omitted province)
0.49 0.300 -2.19 -0.628 -0.71 -0.308 -5.26 -2.121 yes=1 Antananarivo
1.88 1.144 1.01 0.329 4.61 1.806 -2.20 -1.293 yes=1 Toamasina
0.75 0.618 -1.34 -0.516 1.26 0.678 -4.35 -2.253 yes=1 Mahajanga
1.92 1.412 -1.95 -0.598 -0.99 -0.362 -1.01 -0.399 yes=1 Toliara
0.51 0.538 0.25 0.141 4.47 2.920 -1.85 -1.473 yes=1 Antsiranana
0.39 0.048 -2.84 -0.215 -3.11 -0.241 -5.27 -0.385 degree East
1.25 0.216 0.74 0.044 0.54 0.039 3.72 0.271 degree North
Additional controls
0.54 6.726 1.97 0.015 -1.23 -10.763 0.21 1.954 % Percentage of men in total population
1.30 0.020 0.13 0.001 1.09 0.010 3.02 0.026 % Percentage of migrants in male population
-1.32 -0.010 -0.12 -0.004 0.08 0.001 2.82 0.015 % Percentage of men in agriculture or livestock
0.81 0.021 2.58 0.033 -0.52 -0.009 0.56 0.011 % Percentage of female headed households
-1.51 -0.013 0.10 0.001 -1.01 -0.006 2.38 0.015 % Percentage of households with running/pump water
-0.10 -0.001 -1.85 -0.006 -1.40 -0.005 -4.54 -0.020 % Percentage of households with toilet
2.85 0.065 2.64 0.059 2.26 0.032 1.71 0.030 % Percentage of households with electricity
-0.83 -0.056 3.13 23.171 -1.93 -0.095 2.34 0.113 log Number of zebu cattle
0.62 0.026 1.41 0.034 3.37 0.100 0.98 0.024 log Number of sheep and goats
-1.19 -0.653 2.11 0.548 -1.07 -0.416 2.56 1.020 index Ethnic fractionalization index
0.83 0.226 0.95 0.149 -1.46 -0.295 -0.33 -0.055 yes=1 Presence of Bara or Sakalava
0.14 0.030 1.23 0.171 -0.04 -0.007 1.50 0.315 yes=1 Precious stones or gold mined in commune
1.18 0.204 0.68 0.075 2.19 0.292 1.05 0.147 yes=1 Tourist attraction present in commune
-1.32 -0.768 0.58 0.756 -2.23 -0.539 -2.07 -0.400 % Percentage of non-Malagasy population
-1.71 -0.612 0.52 0.110 0.80 0.191 -0.98 -0.265 yes=1 Commune had riots since independence
0.85 0.064 1.70 0.078 1.18 0.073 -0.14 -0.008 # years Number of years road was cut in last 3 years
-1.14 -0.181 1.89 0.130 1.23 0.096 1.35 0.130 # years Number of years with cyclones
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 log Population (offset variable)
-0.38 -15.106 -0.95 -22.876 -0.31 -8.340 1.39 41.142 Intercept
967 967 965 962 Number of observations
0.082 0.087 0.041 0.072 Pseudo R-squared
Selected parameters from uninstrumented regression
2.02 0.181 1.98 0.108 2.48 0.184 1.64 0.120 log Number of law enforcement personnel
2.80 0.253 3.51 0.161 2.07 0.162 1.93 0.147 log Travel time to nearest major city
Since all regressions correct for population size as an offset variable, coefficient estimates measure the effect of regressors on the crime rate.
All regressions allow for the dependence of the variance of the negative binomial distribution on all the regressors.Table 8. Determinants of sense of insecurity, controlling for law enforcement
(Estimator is ordered probit)
z-stat. Coef. Unit Law enforcement (instrumented)
0.96 0.313 log Number of law enforcement personnel
-0.91 -0.299 Residuals from instrumenting equation
Isolation
3.42 0.140 log Travel time to nearest major city
1.16 0.064 log Area
-1.11 -0.190 log Population
Poverty and inequality
1.11 1.393 log Average household income in commune
1.32 1.740 share Headcount index (FGT0) in commune
0.92 2.223 index Poverty gap (FGT1) in commune
Location and province dummies (Fianarantsoa is omitted province)
0.33 0.070 yes=1 Antananarivo
1.74 0.399 yes=1 Toamasina
2.00 0.548 yes=1 Mahajanga
0.10 0.022 yes=1 Toliara
2.36 0.938 yes=1 Antsiranana
-3.13 -0.155 degree East
0.32 0.012 degree North
Additional controls
2.18 10.523 % Percentage of men in total population
1.98 0.011 % Percentage of migrants in male population
1.73 0.005 % Percentage of men in agriculture or livestock
1.29 0.012 % Percentage of female headed households
0.29 0.001 % Percentage of households with running/pump water
0.08 0.000 % Percentage of households with toilet
0.39 0.004 % Percentage of households with electricity
-0.81 -0.022 log Number of zebu cattle
-0.92 -0.015 log Number of sheep and goats
0.31 0.061 index Ethnic fractionalization index
1.99 0.229 yes=1 Presence of Bara or Sakalava
-0.99 -0.098 yes=1 Precious stones or gold mined in commune
0.22 0.017 yes=1 Tourist attraction present in commune
-0.85 -0.124 % Percentage of non-Malagasy population
1.08 0.173 yes=1 Commune had riots since independence
0.69 0.022 # years Number of years road was cut in last 3 years
0.02 0.001 # years Number of years with cyclones
969 Number of observations
0.0730 Pseudo R-squaredTable 9. Endogeneity and exogeneity tests for crime variables
All three (1) Quartiers mobiles Police Gendarmes A. Law enforcement regressions
p-value test stat. p-value test stat. p-value test stat. p-value test stat. test Test that crime is endogenous:
0.0267 15.83 0.0017 22.94 0.0000 47.56 0.0008 24.94 Chi-sq(7) Hausman test
0.1052 1.92 0.0009 4.73 0.0037 3.91 0.0012 4.57 F(3,N) Davidson MacKinnon test
Wald test that instruments are exogenous in
0.5282 5.1321 0.5769 4.7440 0.7399 3.5320 0.3264 6.9396 Chi-sq(6) the law enforcement regressions (3)
Rapes Homicides Burglaries Cattle theft B. Instrumenting regressions
p-value test stat. p-value test stat. p-value test stat. p-value test stat. test F-test that instruments are jointly significant in
0.2632 1.22 0.0000 4.09 0.0269 1.99 0.0002 3.13 F(11,N) the instrumenting regressions for crime
0.126 0.186 0.170 0.230 R-square
(1) When combining all three law enforcement personnel, 'quartiers mobiles' are given a weight of 0.2 to capture their lesser involvement in solving crime.
(2) Testing total law enforcement personnel. Similar results are obtained for other categories of law enforcement personnel.
(3) Using total law enforcement.Table 10. Presence of law enforcement officers, controlling for crime
All three Quartiers mobiles Police Gendarmes (Estimator is censored least-absolute deviation)
z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. Crime (instrumented)
2.83 0.061 0.86 0.025 0.13 0.005 6.85 0.310 log Cattle theft
1.10 0.033 2.22 0.093 1.66 0.098 -2.19 -0.219 log Burglaries
-0.17 -0.015 -1.09 -0.095 -1.34 -0.218 2.04 0.362 log Homicides
-0.61 -0.000 -0.64 -0.000 -0.14 -0.000 -0.35 -0.000 Residuals from instrumenting equation for cattle theft
0.10 0.000 -0.50 -0.001 -0.98 -0.002 0.75 0.004 Residuals from instrumenting equation for burglaries
0.92 0.023 -0.05 -0.001 1.66 0.063 0.02 0.001 Residuals from instrumenting equation for homicides
Isolation
1.50 0.064 -1.24 -0.052 -0.13 -0.007 2.89 0.307 log Travel time to nearest major city
2.56 0.108 0.76 0.042 1.31 0.089 6.32 0.556 log Area
6.76 0.536 7.42 0.532 3.82 0.468 2.88 0.561 log Population
Location and province dummies (Fianarantsoa is omitted province)
0.59 0.078 2.52 0.348 -3.06 -1.773 0.78 0.268 yes=1 Antananarivo
-3.45 -0.642 -4.57 -0.977 0.16 0.042 -3.23 -1.550 yes=1 Toamasina
-1.00 -0.240 -0.07 -0.019 -1.07 -0.415 -0.75 -0.322 yes=1 Mahajanga
-2.64 -0.532 -1.27 -0.326 -0.96 -0.323 1.73 0.554 yes=1 Toliara
-2.30 -0.730 -2.07 -0.742 -3.71 -2.169 -1.77 -1.145 yes=1 Antsiranana
0.65 0.033 3.25 0.193 1.43 0.125 0.04 0.004 degree East
-0.45 -0.015 -1.01 -0.051 -0.22 -0.013 1.45 0.094 degree North
Additional controls
3.98 0.436 2.36 0.377 2.33 0.643 -1.75 -0.552 log Mean income in the commune (1993) (1)
1.06 0.005 -1.32 -0.008 2.83 0.029 -0.37 -0.003 % Percentage of households with running/pump water
1.95 0.003 1.93 0.003 -0.17 -0.000 5.00 0.024 % Percentage of households with toilet
1.28 0.011 -2.23 -0.018 0.44 0.007 4.83 0.087 % Percentage of households with electricity
-0.21 -0.006 0.88 0.036 -0.27 -0.008 0.55 0.030 log Number of zebu cattle
1.11 0.084 1.96 0.182 1.57 0.198 -0.58 -0.092 yes=1 Precious stones or gold mined in commune
0.61 0.155 0.07 0.048 0.18 0.153 2.14 0.734 % Percentage of non-Malagasy population
0.40 0.067 1.17 0.214 1.14 0.422 0.16 0.044 yes=1 Commune had riots since independence
0.21 0.006 -1.66 -0.053 -0.66 -0.029 0.76 0.051 # years Number of years road was cut in last 3 years
0.64 0.024 1.15 0.056 2.15 0.154 -2.26 -0.246 # years Number of years with cyclones
0.16 0.010 1.54 0.129 -2.42 -0.212 -1.22 -0.132 log Travel time to nearest hospital
-2.76 -0.134 -0.99 -0.056 0.11 0.007 -0.12 -0.016 log Travel time to nearest school
2.57 0.649 1.90 0.523 2.84 1.148 -1.50 -0.962 log Average beer price (an indicator of cost of living)
-4.38 -14.341 -3.46 -12.816 -3.41 -23.642 0.20 1.333 Intercept
0.518 0.536 0.739 0.718 Quantile used in estimation
0.184 0.137 0.191 0.230 Pseudo-Rsquare
The dependent variable is log(# law enforcement personnel+1)Table 11. Solving crimes
Recovering stolen (estimator is maximum likelihood Heckman selection model)
Finding murderers cattle
z-stat. Coef. z-stat. Coef. A. Proportion of cases solved
1.26 0.060 2.95 0.090 log Number of law enforcement personnel
-1.27 -0.068 -2.13 -0.072 Residuals from instrumenting equation
Isolation
0.83 0.016 0.42 0.005 log Travel time to nearest major city
-0.38 -0.007 -0.86 -0.011 log Population density
Location and province dummies (Fianarantsoa is omitted province)
0.11 0.009 -2.67 -0.130 yes=1 Antananarivo
3.22 0.300 -0.54 -0.037 yes=1 Toamasina
2.35 0.272 -1.43 -0.105 yes=1 Mahajanga
0.52 0.044 -1.19 -0.058 yes=1 Toliara
3.04 0.471 -0.05 -0.005 yes=1 Antsiranana
0.19 0.005 -0.44 -0.006 degree East
-1.83 -0.036 -0.18 -0.002 degree North
2.29 1.716 0.85 0.411 Intercept
B. Selection equation
Isolation
2.95 0.117 0.01 0.001 log Travel time to nearest major city
-0.03 -0.001 -0.03 -0.002 log Population density
Poverty and inequality
3.90 3.498 0.54 0.539 log Average household income in commune
1.90 2.746 2.03 3.478 share Headcount index (FGT0) in commune
3.11 5.765 -0.33 -0.690 index Poverty gap (FGT1) in commune
Location and province dummies (Fianarantsoa is omitted province)
-1.01 -0.197 1.34 0.308 yes=1 Antananarivo
1.88 0.407 -0.61 -0.152 yes=1 Toamasina
0.37 0.112 2.51 1.032 yes=1 Mahajanga
-1.90 -0.346 -1.58 -0.354 yes=1 Toliara
-0.15 -0.056 0.93 0.407 yes=1 Antsiranana
-4.33 -0.218 -6.02 -0.413 degree East
2.65 0.104 3.57 0.167 degree North
-3.88 -48.374 -0.53 -7.394 Intercept
978 978 Number of observations
513 709 of which uncensored
The dependent variable is the number of cattle (murderers) found over the number of cattle stolen (murders).￿
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